UMPK滑翔炸彈套件（FAB系列）

紀錄

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關；各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Russia: delivered principally by Su-34 strike aircraft

戰場角色

Standoff demolition of fortifications, strongpoints and urban defences from beyond most air-defence range — the tonnage behind Russian assaults since 2023.

優勢

Near-zero cost relative to missiles while drawing on a vast existing bomb stockpile; released in volume week after week; warheads up to three tonnes collapse fortifications no artillery shell can; range has grown steadily through improved and powered kit variants.

限制

Modest accuracy, partly restored by jam-resistant antenna upgrades after Ukrainian GPS jamming degraded early kits; useless against mobile targets; carrier aircraft must still approach release areas, where Patriot ambushes have imposed documented losses.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得：這些戰役中的一個參與組織，與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

• 烏克蘭縱深打擊戰役 自2022年起

  via Air Force (Documented, high confidence)

• 針對烏克蘭電力系統的戰略攻勢 Since October 2022

  via Aerospace Forces (VKS) (Documented, high confidence)

外觀識別

A standard Soviet FAB bomb body with a strap-on kit: pop-out folding wings on a dorsal rack and small tail surfaces — crude and mass-produced in appearance, unlike purpose-built Western glide weapons.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

In documented use since early 2023 and central to the fall of Avdiivka in 2024, where glide-bomb tonnage was publicly assessed as decisive; employment has expanded in volume and range since, including strikes on frontline cities such as Kharkiv. In July 2026 the UN human rights monitoring mission recorded casualties from aerial bombardment — principally glide bombs — at 105 killed and 753 injured, a 143 per cent increase on June and enough to make them the second leading cause of civilian casualties that month. WHAT ACTUALLY COUNTERS THEM — NOT INTERCEPTORS. This is the distinction the module records, because it separates this threat from every other one in the air war. NATO's Joint Air Power Competence Centre assesses the counter as a three-tier disruption of the kill chain, in which shooting the weapon down is the least useful tier. First, deny the target: dispersal, concealment and movement, on the reasoning that prevention is more cost-effective than interception. Second, disrupt the weapon: electronic warfare and satellite-navigation jamming are identified as "the most effective countermeasure", exploiting the kit's navigation dependency, with the backup inertial system described as prone to significant drift — while continuous use of NASAMS, Patriot or S-300 against glide bombs is assessed as "unsustainable owing to war-reserve material and cost limitations". Third, destroy the shooter: aerial interception by fighters and strikes against airfields and dispersed launch platforms, described as "the most decisive way to defeat glide bombs" but requiring robust suppression and destruction of enemy air defences. The consequence for this module is that glide-bomb casualties and ballistic-missile casualties are constrained by entirely different supply chains, and no single decision about interceptor supply addresses both.

軍種與兵種使用方

• 空軍 有文件記錄
• 空天軍（VKS） 有文件記錄