Operation Serval — Force Atlas

State affiliation · France
رمز فئة من Vigil · ليس شارة رسمية

مصدر الهوية

State affiliation: France.

رمز فئة من Vigil — مستمد من مجال هذا السجل نفسه ومستواه ودوره. ليس شارة رسمية.

نبذة

التدخل الفرنسي الذي انطلق في 11 يناير 2013 فكسر الاحتلال الجهادي لشمال مالي في غضون أسابيع، ثم خاض حملة Adrar des Ifoghas ضد تنظيم القاعدة في بلاد المغرب الإسلامي؛ وأُدمج في عملية برخان على مستوى الساحل في 1 أغسطس 2014.

النطاق: البنية والدور والأصول والروابط. لم تُنشر سجلات تابعة.
التبعية: التبعية التاريخية
المصادر: في السجل: 2
حالة السجل: جزئي

المنطقة العامة للنشاط: From the Konna front in central Mali to Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, and the Adrar des Ifoghas massif on the Algerian border, January 2013 – August 2014.
تاريخ بارز: Launched on 11 January 2013 within hours of a jihadist push from Konna toward Sévaré and the road to Bamako, at the Malian government's request and with Security Council backing, Serval combined French air strikes, airborne and mechanised ground forces and Chadian troops to retake Gao and Timbuktu by the end of January and enter Kidal in early February. The harder campaign followed in the Adrar des Ifoghas, where French and Chadian forces fought AQIM's Saharan command through February and March and killed its emir Abdelhamid Abou Zeid. At its peak the operation fielded some 4,500 French personnel. It handed the northern towns to Malian forces and the African-led mission that became MINUSMA, and on 1 August 2014 was folded into Barkhane, the region-wide operation built on the judgement that the threat was Sahelian rather than Malian.
نقاط القوة: Speed, air power and desert logistics: an expeditionary campaign that reversed the occupation of a territory the size of France in weeks and was widely judged a tactical success, and the model for the French posture that followed.
مواطن القصور: A military answer to a political question. Serval could expel an insurgency from cities but not resolve the governance vacuum that had produced it, and its handling of Kidal — entered with the MNLA rather than the Malian army — set up the grievance Bamako carried for a decade. The jihadist organisations it scattered regrouped in the countryside and across the borders, which is why Barkhane was needed and why it too fell short.