СВП (запис про спроможність)

Послужний список

Значення для конфліктів

Це єдиний запис каталогу для цієї системи. Вона стосується модуля нижче; Force Atlas кожного модуля показує, як її там застосовують.

Оператори

JNIM: The principal user across central Mali and the Burkina and Niger borderlands; claims of convoy attacks recur in the group's own messaging. · Islamic State Sahel Province: Documented in the Liptako-Gourma, including against army columns.

Роль на полі бою

Road denial and attrition: IEDs impose the convoy problem that shapes every campaign — they made MINUSMA the UN’s deadliest mission, strangle corridor traffic, and killed the defence minister in the April 2026 Kati bombing.

Typical employment

Emplacement on the routes that garrisons and convoys cannot avoid, combined with mounted ambush; the pairing with technical-mounted firepower is what turns a road strike into a convoy defeat.

How the system is commonly used, at the level of published analysis — never a procedure, a loadout or an engagement envelope.

Сильні сторони

Cheap denial of expensive mobility; ties down route-clearance capability the government has little of, and converts every road movement into a decision about risk.

Обмеження

Indiscriminate by nature — civilian vehicles and buses are routine victims, at direct cost to the groups’ local standing, and the UN and civil-society casualty records that document this are among the most consistent public sources on the war.

Typically used alongside

• Технічки (озброєні пікапи)Впевненість: помірна

  Ambush on the corridors combines explosive initiation with mounted firepower; the two capabilities appear together in documented convoy attacks.

• Мотоцикли (мобільність повстанців)Впевненість: помірна

  Motorcycles provide the reconnaissance, emplacement and withdrawal that a roadside attack depends on.

Значення для кампаній

Виведено: організація-учасник цих кампаній має типізований зв’язок із цією системою. Це не те саме, що задокументоване застосування системи в самій кампанії.

• Оточення Джибо З лютого 2022 року

  via JNIM — Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Documented, high confidence)

• Кампанія паливної блокади JNIM Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed since

  via JNIM — Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Documented, high confidence)

• Наступи FLA–JNIM, 2026 April 2026 – present

  via JNIM — Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Documented, high confidence); Islamic State Sahel Province (Documented, moderate confidence)

• Тиск у Тіллабері Documented pattern since 2025

  via Islamic State Sahel Province (Documented, moderate confidence); JNIM — Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Documented, high confidence)

Візуальна ідентифікація

None recorded, by rule: this record describes an effect on the war, not a device.

Задокументоване застосування в конфлікті

Documented continuously since 2013 in the Secretary-General's reports on Mali, which recorded IEDs as the leading cause of MINUSMA fatalities, and in ACLED's event data for central Mali and the tri-border area. The pattern has moved from the peacekeepers' supply routes to the state's garrison corridors and, from late 2025, to the commercial traffic the southern corridors carry. The April 2026 Kati bombing is the module's most consequential single documented instance.

Задокументовані формування

• «Ісламська держава – провінція Сахель» Documented · moderate confidence
• JNIM — «Група підтримки ісламу та мусульман» Задокументовано · висока впевненість