ما كانت هذه الحملة
Ukraine's Kharkiv and Kherson operations in late 2022 produced the war's largest territorial reversals against an overstretched line. The southern offensive of 2023, against months of prepared defences and dense minefields, did not achieve breakthrough. The contrast is the campaign's finding.
This campaign is the clearest natural experiment the war has produced. The same army, using broadly the same method, succeeded spectacularly against an unprepared defence and failed against a prepared one — which established that the decisive variable was preparation and density rather than equipment quality or training. Its failure ended the expectation of a negotiated settlement from a position of Ukrainian strength, preceded the interruption in US supply, and is the reason both sides subsequently invested in fortification and in deep strike rather than in manoeuvre.
الثقة: عالية حتى 2023-11رُوجع 2026-07-26
ملخص
In September 2022 Ukrainian forces broke through a thinly held sector in Kharkiv region and recovered a large area in days, then forced a Russian withdrawal from Kherson city and the west bank of the Dnipro in November. Both succeeded against a line that was overextended after the summer's fighting and had not been prepared in depth. Through the winter and spring of 2023 Ukraine assembled and trained new brigades on Western equipment for a decisive southern offensive, while Russia used the same months to build the most extensive field fortifications seen in Europe since the Second World War — layered minefields, anti-tank obstacles and prepared positions across the southern approaches. The offensive that began in June 2023 penetrated the outer belt in places and did not achieve operational breakthrough. It was formally acknowledged as having fallen short by late autumn.
الأهداف المعلنة
ما يقوله المشاركون. يذكر كل بند الموضع الذي أُعلن فيه الموقف؛ ويسجل Vigil أنه صدر، لا أنه صحيح.
Ukraine stated the objective of the 2023 offensive as severing the land corridor to Crimea and restoring occupied territory, without publishing an operational plan.
الأهداف بحسب التقييم
قراءة Vigil، مصنّفة بدرجات. وتُفصل بنيويًا عن المواقف المعلنة كي لا يُنشر تقييمٌ أبدًا على أنه هدف أعلنه أحد.
The 2022 operations exploited an opportunity created by Russian overextension rather than executing a long-planned design; the Kharkiv breakthrough in particular was against a sector held at very low density.
The 2023 offensive was shaped by expectations set publicly in advance, which reduced surprise and gave the defence time it used effectively — an assessment made by Ukrainian and Western officials after the fact as well as by analysts.
القوات الرئيسية
- القوات المسلحة الأوكرانية القوة الرئيسية · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2023-11
- اللواء الآلي 47 «Magura» القوة الرئيسية · الثقة: متوسطة · حتى 2023-08
One of the Western-equipped brigades formed for the 2023 offensive and widely reported in its opening phase. Recorded as a participant, not located.
- اللواء الهجومي 92 القوة الرئيسية · الثقة: متوسطة · حتى 2022-09
Associated in open reporting with the Kharkiv axis in September 2022.
القوات المقابلة
- القوات البرية قوة مقابلة · الثقة: عالية · حتى 2023-11
- القوات المحمولة جوًا (VDV) قوة مقابلة · الثقة: متوسطة · حتى 2023-09
Airborne formations were repeatedly used as a mobile defensive reserve in the southern sector during 2023.
The Kharkiv breakthrough
A rapid advance through a thinly held sector recovered a large area of Kharkiv region within days, collapsing a Russian defensive line that had been stripped to reinforce the south.
The Kherson withdrawal
Sustained pressure on crossings and supply across the Dnipro made the Russian position on the west bank untenable, and Russian forces withdrew across the river in November — a decision taken to preserve the force rather than one imposed by assault.
The winter both sides used
Ukraine formed and trained new brigades on Western equipment; Russia built layered defensive belts across the southern approaches. The offensive's outcome was substantially determined in these months.
The southern offensive and its culmination
Attacks against the prepared belts made limited penetrations at high cost. Demining under observed fire proved the binding problem, and the offensive culminated without reaching the operational objective.
النتيجة والوضع الحالي
One large success and one clear failure, with the second the more consequential. The 2022 operations recovered substantial territory and demonstrated that Russian lines could be broken where they were thin. The 2023 offensive established the opposite: that a prepared, mined and observed defence could not be penetrated at acceptable cost with the forces and methods available. Since its culmination, neither side has attempted an operation of comparable ambition, and both have shifted effort toward attrition and deep strike.
التكيّفات المرصودة
Ukraine abandoned large combined-arms assault after the summer of 2023 in favour of small-unit action supported by drones and artillery, the method that has characterised the eastern campaign since.
Russia adopted large-scale field fortification as a standing practice rather than an emergency measure, which has raised the cost of any future offensive by either side.
التداعيات السياسية
The 2023 failure removed the expectation of settlement from Ukrainian strength and preceded the most serious interruption in US support.
التداعيات العسكرية
Established prepared depth and dense mining as decisive against contemporary combined-arms breakthrough, a finding now studied well beyond this theatre.
الأحداث المرتبطة
المواقع
أماكن ينشرها هذا الملف أصلًا بوصفها علامات على الخريطة، وتُدرج لأن الحملة تتعلق بها. ليست منطقة عمليات.
ما لا يزال مجهولًا
- The planning history of the 2023 offensive is described inconsistently by Ukrainian, US and European participants, and the disagreement about advice given and taken is unresolved.
- Losses of Western-supplied equipment during the offensive are documented visually by open-source projects but are incomplete by construction.
- The density and depth of Russian minefields is described qualitatively in open sources; no reliable published survey exists.
قراءات تدعمها الأدلة أيضًا
- The 2023 failure can be attributed to insufficient or late-arriving Western capability, to the loss of surprise, to Ukrainian operational choices, or simply to the strength of prepared defences against any available method. Participants have advanced all four, they are not mutually exclusive, and public evidence does not weight them.
- The Kherson withdrawal can be read as a Ukrainian success or as a successfully executed Russian decision to shorten an untenable line. Both are true descriptions of the same event and they imply different things about Russian command quality at that point.
مُدرجة لأن تقييم السجل نفسه ليس التقييم الوحيد الذي تسمح به مصادره — لا بوصفها تحوّطًا من التقييم أعلاه.
ما إذا كان أيٌّ من الطرفين سيحاول مجددًا تحقيق اختراق عملياتي
Neither has since 2023. A renewed attempt would signal that one side believed the drone-saturated defensive advantage had been solved.
الروايات اللاحقة للمشاركين
Ukrainian, US and European accounts of the 2023 planning disagree about what was advised and what was chosen. New accounts change the historical record rather than the current situation.
اعرض القوة التي تدير هذه الحملة في «استكشف» تفاعلي: اختر هذا السجل وتتبّع ما يرتبط به.
التقييم حتى — 2023-11 آخر مراجعة — 2026-07-26