الموجز الأسبوعي العالمي — 26 يوليو 2026

Mykhailo Drapatyi replaced Oleksandr Syrskyi as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and Ihor Skybiuk became chief of the General Staff. The change occurred amid protests and an unresolved political crisis surrounding former defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Why it matters. The appointment places a younger, technology-oriented commander at the centre of Ukraine's next phase of corps reform, active defence and long-range operations. The watch item is whether the personnel change produces institutional reform rather than only a change of leadership.

• I have determined who will be the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine — Office of the President of Ukraine, 2026-07-21
• Commander Mykhailo Drapatyi becomes Ukraine's commander-in-chief — Reuters, 2026-07-21

اقرأ هذا البند في موجز أوكرانيا–روسيا ←الموجز الأسبوعي الكامل لأوكرانيا–روسيا ←

The Washington Post reported that US officials were considering military options against JNIM. No strike order, agreement or final decision has been announced. Mali's foreign minister said the government had received no official proposal; he did not rule out cooperation, but said any partner must respect Mali's sovereignty.

Why it matters. A strike decision would return the United States to a direct kinetic role in Mali and create a new relationship with a government aligned with Russia. Airstrikes could damage leadership and infrastructure but would not by themselves restore control of roads, towns or border systems.

• Trump administration weighs military options in Mali, officials say — The Washington Post, 2026-07-22
• Mali's government does not rule out US military intervention — The Washington Post, 2026-07-24

Read this item in the Sahel brief →Full Sahel weekly brief →

Chinese live-fire drills ran on 23 and 24 July, with activity centred near Dongshan Island and the adjacent Chinese coast rather than around Taiwan itself. Taiwan condemned the exercise. Both the geography and the scale were below those of the December island-encircling exercises.

Why it matters. The module's lower routine-air-activity baseline does not amount to de-escalation. Beijing retains the ability to switch from persistent pressure to short, visible exercises without committing to the scale of a blockade or encirclement rehearsal.

• China announces live-fire drills in Taiwan Strait — Reuters, 2026-07-23

اقرأ هذا البند في موجز مضيق تايوان ←الموجز الأسبوعي الكامل لمضيق تايوان ←

Three Aframax tankers loaded Iraqi fuel oil at Baniyas between June and July for delivery to the United States, with the cargo trucked from Iraq into Syria. What is moving is fuel oil — not Syrian oil, and not Iraqi crude or naphtha. Crude and naphtha facilities are being prepared, but those exports have not begun.

Why it matters. The route gives Syria a renewed transit and port role while giving Iraq an alternative to Gulf shipping. Its truck-dependent structure is expensive, but it creates a new layer of Iraqi–Syrian economic interdependence that may continue after the immediate shipping disruption.

• US imports first fuel oil cargoes shipped via Syria as Iraq leverages new export route — Reuters, 2026-07-23

اقرأ هذا البند في موجز سوريا ←الموجز الأسبوعي الكامل لسوريا ←

The European Union imposed a transaction ban on Georgia's Kulevi refinery over its processing of Russian crude — the first EU measure against a major Georgian company under the Russia sanctions regime. The measure takes effect in six months. The refinery says it intends to move from Russian crude to supplies from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

Why it matters. The sanctions regime has moved from Georgia's general exposure to a named strategic asset. The six-month delay creates a test of whether the refinery genuinely diversifies and whether Georgia can preserve its transit role without becoming part of Russia's circumvention system.

• EU sanctions Georgian refinery processing Russian crude — Reuters, 2026-07-24

اقرأ هذا البند في موجز القوقاز ←الموجز الأسبوعي الكامل للقوقاز ←